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held that equitable tolling was
unnecessary in a securities fraud
case because the limitations period
would not begin to run until a
plaintiff knew or should have known
that a fraud had been perpetrated.
In the present securities fraud
case, the Seventh Circuit found that
the limitations period does not begin
to run until a plaintiff knows both
that she has been misled and that
defendant intended to make a false
statement. Once both of these
requirements are met, the statute
begins to run. The court found this
interpretation to be consistent with
the Supreme Court's holding that the
equitable tolling period was unnecessary in securities fraud cases.
The court determined that an
objective test should be used to
determine when the limitations
period had begun to run in a fraud
case. Based on this analysis in the
present case, the statute would have

began to run when Plaintiffs should
have known of fraud, not when they
actually became aware of it. The
court concluded that since Defendants had not proved that the
investors became aware of the fraud
before Plaintiffs claimed they had,
Defendants had not proved their
affirmative defense that the limitations period had run.

Market, Not Fraud, Led to
Stock Losses
As an alternative defense,
Defendants produced a financial
expert's report which showed that
the drop in Defendants' stock price
'was consistent with the fluctuations
of the entire stock market. Plaintiffs
did not respond to this defense,
leaving the court without a basis to
question the report. Because the
report indicated that the loss would
have occurred even if Defendants

had not committed fraud, the court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the case. The court reasoned that
because competitors' stock prices
moved in a manner similar to
Defendants'stock, market forces
rather than fraud caused the decline
in Defendants' stock prices.
Therfore, the court held that
Plaintiffs had not met their burden
of proving fraud.
In conclusion, though the court
dismissed Defendant's statute of
limitations defense, it agreed with
Defendant's market forces defense.
The court held that absent proof that
the losses were not a result of
market forces, Plaintiff's fraud claim
could not be supported.

Limitations in Trademark Agreements Are Not Trade
Restrictions
by Linda A. Kerns
In Clorox Co. v. Sterling
Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d
Cir. 1997), the owner of the PINESOL trademark, the Clorox Company ("Clorox") alleged that
Sterling Winthrop, Inc. and Reckitt
& Colman, Inc. ("Reckitt"), the
former and current owners of the
LYSOL trademark violated the
Sherman Act. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court, holding that a trade310
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mark agreement which limited the
use of the PINE-SOL trademark
neither restrained trade nor created a
monopoly.
Clorox develops and sells
cleaning and disinfectant products
for household use and has a thirtyseven percent share of the allpurpose household cleaning market.
In 1990, Clorox purchased PINESOL, the oldest, best-selling pineoil-based cleaner on the market. The
PINE-SOL trademark has been used

since 1945 and was federally
registered in 1957.
Defendants also develop and sell
household cleaning products.
Sterling purchased the LYSOL mark
in 1966 and sold it to the codefendant in this litigation in 1994.
Reckitt currently has approximately
fifteen percent of the all-purpose
household cleaning market. The
LYSOL name has had federal
trademark protection as a disinfectant cleaner since 1906. LYSOL
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spray disinfectant is the dominant
disinfectant cleaner among products
of its type, with only minimal
competition from lesser-known
brands.

LYSOL and PINE-SOL
Litigation Dates Back to the
1940s
The litigation between the
owners of these two product brands
began in the 1940s. The owners of
the LYSOL mark opposed the maker
of PINE-SOL's original attempt to
obtain federal trademark protection.
At the time, PINE-SOL was
written without the hyphen as
"PINESOL." The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office denied the
registration, finding that a consumer
could confuse the two trademarks
due to their similarity.
The owners of the PINE-SOL
mark ignored the Patent Office's
decision and continued to use the
trademark on their products. The
owner of LYSOL responded by
filing suit. The owners reached a
settlement in 1956 and agreed to
three major restrictions on the use of
the PINE-SOL trademark, including:
(1) limiting the mark PINE-SOL
to products that contained pine oil as
the active ingredient;
(2) illustrating pine or evergreen
trees on PINE-SOL products; and
(3) maintaining separation
between "PINE" and "SOL" so that
the PINE-SOL name would not be
confused with LYSOL, which would
always appear as one word.
In return, the agreement permitted PINE-SOL to be used as a
"general household cleaner consisting primarily of pine oil" or a "pine
oil cleaner, disinfectant and deodor-
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ant." The owners of PINE-SOL also
were free to expand the use of the
mark to products other than general
household cleaners.
In 1965, the owners of the
LYSOL trademark sued Cyanamid,
who then owned the PINE-SOL
trademark, for using the PINE-SOL
mark on an aerosol spray disinfectant. In 1967, the parties came to a
second agreement that the PINESOL mark could be used on various
cleaning products but not on aerosol
spray disinfectants.
In 1983, Cyanamid, PINE-SOL's
owner, sued Sterling, LYSOL's
owner, for selling a product called
LYSOL PINE ACTION. The suit
alleged a violation of the 1967
agreement, unfair competition, and
trade dress infringement. In 1987,
before the 1983 matter was resolved,
Sterling then sued Cyanamid for
marketing a non-aerosol pump spray
disinfectant with the PINE-SOL
trademark.
In 1987, the parties settled both
the 1983 and 1987 disputes. The
1987 agreement included the
following provisions:
(1) disinfectant products with the
PINE-SOL mark were restricted to
two products per geographic area;
(2) the original PINE-SOL
product could be promoted primarily
as a cleaner but not as a disinfectant;
(3) PINE-SOL products were
limited to all-purpose, generic
cleaners.
Additionally, under the agreement, Sterling permitted Cyanamid
to market a "multi-purpose pump
spray household cleaner with
disinfecting properties," and
Cyanamid permitted Sterling to
market and sell LYSOL PINE
ACTION CLEANER.

Clorox Obtained Rights to
PINE-SOL and Challenged
Prior Trademark
Agreements
In 1990, Clorox purchased the
rights to PINE-SOL with the full
knowledge that the PINE-SOL
trademark remained subject to the
existing 1987 agreement. The
current case is the most recent
dispute in the longstanding battle
between the owners of the PINESOL and LYSOL trademarks.
Clorox filed the present lawsuit in
1992 to contest the preliminary
injunction which barred a television
advertisement for a Clorox PINESOL product. Sterling alleged that
Clorox violated the 1987 agreement
because the advertisement emphasized the disinfectant qualities of
PINE-SOL.
Clorox alleged that the 1987
agreement served no legitimate
trademark purpose because there is
no longer the same likelihood of
confusion between LYSOL and
PINE-SOL as there might hav'e been
in the 1940s. Clorox claimed that
the 1987 agreement violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act since it
restrained trade and perpetuated a
monopoly by LYSOL's owners in
the cleaner-disinfectant market.
According to Clorox, limiting the
use of the PINE-SOL mark prevented Clorox from competing
effectively in a difficult market.

District Court Granted
Sterling's Summary
Judgment Motion
Sterling moved for summary
judgment in the present suit. In
1996, the district court granted
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summary judgment, reasoning that
"Clorox had shown 'no competitive
limitation on the owner of the PINESOL market [sic]; no price fixing;
no division of markets territorial or
product; no group boycott; or
concerted refusals to deal with a
competitor,"' the typical types of
conduct which usually violate
federal antitrust laws. Clorox
appealed the judgment, alleging
restraint of trade and perpetuation of
a monopoly.

Clorox Alleged Restraint
of Trade
The appellate court used a "rule
of reason" analysis in assessing
Clorox's restraint of trade claim.
Under the "rule of reason," the
plaintiff must prove an antitrust
injury. The antitrust issue in the
present case was "whether the
restraints in the agreements are
reasonable in light of their actual
effects on the market and their procompetitive justifications." To
determine whether restraints on
competition in the agreement violate
the rule of reason, and therefore
would potentially harm consumers,
courts consider the following:
(1) whether the plaintiff has
shown that the restraint has an
adverse effect on competition;
(2) whether the defendant
established a "pro-competitive,
redeeming virtue" for the restraint
on trade; and
(3) where the defendant established a pro-competitive reason for
the restraint, whether the plaintiff
has proved that there are alternative,
less restrictive means available to
the defendant than the restraints in
the agreement.
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The court began its "rule of
reason" analysis by considering
whether Clorox had shown that the
restraints on the parties in the 1987
agreement had an adverse effect on
competition. In trying to show that
the 1987 agreement was an unlawful
restriction on competition, Clorox
argued the "megabrand theory."
Under this theory, companies need
to rely on established brand names
in order to introduce new products
into the market due to the high costs
and risks associated with introducing new products. However, this
theory did not persuade the court for
three reasons. First, the Clorox name
itself is a "megabrand." Second, the
use of the PINE-SOL brand would
not automatically guarantee success.
Finally, Clorox failed to prove that
large companies are incapable of
competing in the markets allegedly
dominated by the LYSOL mark.
In particular, the court noted that
both the 1987 and 1967 agreements
did not prevent Clorox from using
the PINE-SOL name to compete in
the household cleaner and disinfectant market. The agreements only
required that Clorox market its
products primarily as cleaners and
secondarily as disinfectants. The
court reasoned that antitrust laws
only aim to promote competition,
not guarantee companies the right to
easy and unencumbered advance
into a market. In other words,
antitrust laws are designed to protect
market competition, not competitors
themselves. Additionally, the court
noted that a trademark is nonexclusionary since it only confers
the rights to a name, not an idea or
product. Because of the nonexclusionary nature of trademarks, it
is rare that a disadvantageous

trademark agreement raises. antitrust
concerns. Since the 1987 agreement
only limited Clorox's use of the
PINE-SOL mark, and not Clorox's
ability to compete with the LYSOL
brand, the court concluded that the
1987 agreement did not restrict
competition, as it did not restrict any
competitor's ability to enter the
market allegedly dominated by
LYSOL. Therefore, the agreement
did not constitute a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act under a "rule
of reason" analysis.

The Court Also Rejected
Clorox's Monopoly
Allegations
In addition to the antitrust claim,
Clorox also alleged that the 1987
agreement furthered a monopoly
allegedly held by the defendant in
disinfectant cleaning markets. In
response, the court outlined the two
elements of a monopoly claim:
(1) "the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market," and
(2) "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident."
For the same reasons relied upon
to reject the restraint of trade claim,
the court also held that Clorox failed
to prove either of these elements.
The court affirmed the judgment of
the district court, yet noted in its
opinion that this probably will not
be the "last... stage of the ongoing
fight between the owners of the
LYSOL and PINE-SOL marks."
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